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THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE PROGRAMS:
DID THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
I
IN ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS VPENA REALLY MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
By Jennifer L. Haynes2
I INTRODUCTION
Upon remand from the Supreme Court, the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado ren-
dered the final decision in Adarand Constructors v. 
Pena.3
The district court held that the Disadvantaged Business
Enterprise (DBE) program implemented by the Federal
Highway Administration failed the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review. The United States Senate, however,
recently voted to reject an amendment which would
eliminate this DBE program. Although the program sur-
vived the Senate, the district court's decision highlights
the difficulty that Congress faces in developing national
affirmative action legislation that meets the strict scruti-
ny standard. Strict scrutiny erodes Congress' enforce-
ment powers under section five of the Fourteenth6
Amendment. Consequently, Congress' ability to alleviate
discrimination through affirmative action is impaired.
Both business and government employers imple-
ment affirmative action programs to rectify past discrim-
ination. There are generally three reasons why employ-
ers implement such programs. First, employees or other
IAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
Jennifer Haynes, candidate for Juris Doctor, 1999. 1 wish to
thank Professor Roger Groot, Mr.Jesse Haynes, Elizabeth Garcia,
and Cortland Putbrese for their assistance and comments on
this article.
3Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995),
remanded to Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 965 E Supp.
1556 (1997).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 965 E Supp. 1556
(1997).
5Alan Fram, Senate Preserves Minority Contracts,
Washington Post, March 6,1998. Congress rejected the amend-
ment by a vote of 58 to 37;Id.
6U.S. Const. amend. MV, § 1 and § 5.These sections read:
§ 1 All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No state shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immu-
nities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws...
§5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article. (emphasis
added)
identifiable victims of discrimination sue the employer
for discriminatory practices. 8 In response to the lawsuit,
the employer establishes a private affirmative action
plan. Second, employers may voluntarily enact affirma-
tive action programs to avoid litigation if demonstrated
discrimination exists.9 Third, governments at all levels
may implement affirmative action programs such as
DBE's. Therefore, Disadvantaged Business Enterprise
programs fall under the larger umbrella of affirmative
action.
DBE's are affirmative action programs designed to
give women and minorities preferential status in the gov-
ernment contract bidding process. DBE contracts typi-
cally provide the government with various services,
products, manufacturing, or construction. The govern-
ment generally maintains a goal of ten percent participa-
tion for DBE program members.' 2 DBE's, like other affir-
mative action programs, attempt to rectify past and pre-
sent discrimination in two ways. First, the programs seek
to increase minority entrepreneurship in industries• '3
which discriminate. Second, such programs attempt to
increase interaction between minority and nonminority
In fact, in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), the Supreme Court outlined the
factors necessary for the implementation of affirmative action.
This decision coupled with the Supreme Court's decisions in
Title VII challenges to affirmative action outline the parameters
of affirmative action programs.These factors will be discussed
in detail later in the article.
8See Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 26 E3d 1545
(11th Cir. 1994), for an example of a government employer
responsible for discriminatory conduct.
9See United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
:0See City of Richmond vJ.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
Most DBE programs include both women and racial
minorities. The Supreme Court has addressed only the racial
component when deciding cases dealing with DBE programs.
In most states, however, women participate in DBE programs at
a greater rate than racial minorities. See Adarand, supra, note
179.
" The Civil Rights Division of the United States
Department of Justice, Before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 105th
Congress (1998) (statement of Michael Kennedy, General
Counsel of the Associated General Contractors of America).
13The Use of Section 8a Contracts, Before the Senate
Committee on Small Business, 103rd Congress (1994) (state-
entrepreneurs and further diminish or eliminate discrim-
ination within the targeted industry.
The purpose of this article is to determine whether
the Adarand decision has impacted Disadvantaged
Business Enterprise programs. As stated previously,
Congress traditionally has used its enforcement powers
under the Fourteenth Amendment to redress the problem
of racial discrimination. Unfortunately, the Adarand deci-
sion may undermine Congress' ability under the
Constitution to eliminate discrimination through affirma-
tive action legislation. Each of the fifty states has unique
demographics with differing proportions of various racial
groups. Because of this diversity, Congress alone is in the
best position to develop and implement legislation that
addresses nationwide racial discrimination within particu-
lar industries. Adarand's requirement of strict scrutiny
raises the issue of whether Congress can continue to
effectively remedy racial discrimination through programs
like DBE's. This article will examine the current state of
affirmative action law and its impact on DBEs. It will con-
clude by analyzing federal DBE program data to determine
if the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand has affected
Disadvantaged Business Enterprise programs.
This article is divided into five parts. Part I deals with
the United States Supreme Court's treatment of constitu-
tional challenges to affirmative action. Part II examines
Title VII challenges to affirmative action programs. Title
VII cases are included because the district court in
Adarand relied on many of the same factors that courts
utilize in evaluating Title VII claims. Part III discusses the
Colorado district court's application of the strict scruti-
ny standard as articulated by the Supreme Court in
Adarand. This case illustrates the difficulties which
Congress faces in enacting future race-based legislation
such as DBE programs. Part IV predicts trends in the law
and implementation of DBE programs. Part V concludes
with a discussion of the Federal Highway Administra-
tion's DBE program. This particular program illustrates
Adarand's economic impact on DBE programs. The
Federal Highway Adminstration's DBE program further
demonstrates the manner DBE programs are adminis-
tered at the state level.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION
This section examines the major Supreme Court
14
Written Testimony of the Council of Minority and
Women-Owned Businesses, Before the Senate Committee on
Small Business, 104th Congress (1995).
15Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978).
'6 d. at 269.
Zd. at 279.
Id. at 277-78.
decisions on affirmative action. The Supreme Court first
addressed the issue of affirmative action in Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke. 15 Until Bakke, the
Court had not considered the use of benign racial classi-
fications. In Bakke, the Supreme Court addressed a
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge to a
strict quota system. 16The Court examined the admissions
policy at the University of California Davis Medical
School, which set aside sixteen slots exclusively for
members of racial minorities to increase the number of
minorities in the medical school. 7 Bakke argued that the
strict quota system unfairly discriminated against white
students. The University of California claimed that
while the school had never discriminated on the basis of
race, the strict quota system was necessary because soci-
etal factors had placed minorities at a disadvantage in the
admissions process.19
The Bakke decision outlined the basic framework of
affirmative action case law. The Court stated that a strict
quota system was an improper use of affirmative action.
Furthermore, broad-based societal discrimination does not
justify the use of an affirmative action plan. °The affirma-
tive action plan must be tied to the actual conduct of the21
entity implementing the program. Despite the Court's
rejection of a strict quota system, a plurality stated that
using race as a "plus" factor was acceptable. Essentially,
this means that when evaluating two equal candidates, the
university could choose a racial minority over a nonmi-
noriry in the interest of establishing a diverse student
body." Thus, the Court disassembled the school's affirma-
tive action program, but allowed the university to consid-
er race when making admission decisions.
To some degree, the Bakke decision was dependent
on its facts. Unlike affirmative action in the workplace, the
Court recognized the unique environment created in the24
educational arena. As early as the first desegregation
cases, the Court acknowledged that the educational
process benefits from the free flow of ideas exchanged
among people of different races, genders and economic
backgrounds." In evaluating the stated goals of the
California affirmative action program,Justice Powell wrote:
[A diverse student body] clearly is a constitu-
tionally permissible goal for an institution of
higher education. Academic freedom, though
not a specifically enumerated constitutional
right, long has been viewed as a special concern
of the First Amendment. The freedom of a uni-
versity to make its own judgments as to educa-
26
tion includes the selection of its student body.
"Id. at 306.
20Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
Id. at 307-08.
Id.. at 312.
"Id. at 315.241d. at 314.
25Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
26
Id. at 311-12.
In the employment sphere, the Supreme Court
required more than a desire for a diverse workforce to
justify the use of affirmative action. Some commentators
fear that the same justifications used to substantiate dis-
crimination in the past will be used to validate discrimi-
nation against whites. These commentators believe that
affirmative action programs prevent the development of
an impartial process for allocating jobs, government
resources, and college admissions. 7 In response to these
concerns, the Court articulated two important limits.
First, the Court stated that a qualified affirmative action
28
plan must have a logical stopping point. Second, the
Court articulated a desire to establish a strong correla-
tion between the groups targeted by the plan and the
local demographic area.
In City of Richmond v.JA. Croson,30 the Supreme
Court increased the standard of review for race-based
legislation enacted at the state level. 31 Croson dealt with
a city-sponsored DBE program which provided prefer-
ences for all identifiable racial and ethnic groups without
32
regard to their actual presence within Richmond. The
plan included blacks, Spanish-speaking individuals, ori-
entals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.! In addition, the plan
did not have a geographical limit, and any qualified DBE31
could participate in the program. Croson argued that
the plan was overinclusive and that it discriminated35
against white contractors. The Court increased the
standard of review for state race-based legislation and
remanded the case to the district court for further pro-
ceedings. 3 The decision required strict scrutiny review
of any state or local government race-based legislation.As
a result of this decision, localities began to increase the
use of statistical analysis to prove with particularity that
37
discrimination exists.
In the year following the Croson decision, the Court
in Metro Broadcasting v. Federal Communications
2George R. LaNoue & John Sullivan, "But For"
Discrimination:How Many Minority Owned Businesses Would
There Be?, 24 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 93,97 (1992-1993).
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 187 (1987).
2id.








31Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Fed. Communications
Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand




Commission revived the reasoning in Bakke. In Metro
Broadcasting, the Court upheld a Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) program which granted minori-
ties preferential status in the purchasing of television and
radio stations.3 The petitioner challenged the program,
arguing that white buyers were denied equal protection
because the FCC only allowed people of color to pur-
chase broadcast stations at the special low rate. The
Court upheld this program under an intermediate level
of scrutiny.' Although the Court later overruled this
application of intermediate scrutiny in Adarand, the
Court did not reject the reasoning of the Metro
Broadcasting case. In ruling for the FCC, the Court stat-
ed that the "wildest [sic] possible dissemination of infor-
mation from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential
to the welfare of the public." The Court also noted that
enhancing broadcast diversity is an important govern-
mental objective and a sufficient basis for upholding the
FCC program. Thus, the Supreme Court in Metro
Broadcasting gave weight to the First Amendment con-
cerns articulated in Bakke.
Just six years after the Croson Court discussed the
greater latitude afforded the federal government in race-
based legislation, 45 the Supreme Court issued the
Adarand decision. In Adarand, the Court extended the
strict scrutiny standard articulated in Croson to congres-46
sional legislation. The Adarand Court evaluated a DBE
program established by the United States Department of
47
Transportation. This DBE program, established under
48
the Intermodal Surface Transportation Act, included
nearly every racial minority within the United 
States.49
The DBE program applied to all states equally and
allowed individual state d 3partments of transportation to
implement the program. State transportation officials
determine the eligibility of businesses wishing to partic-
ipate in the program. Furthermore, state transportation
41Id. at 566.
42Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227
(1995).
43Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 566 (quoting Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
" d. at 567-68.
4JA. Croson, 488 U.S. at 469. In this case, the Supreme
Court states: "The power to 'enforce' may at times also include
the power to define situations which Congress determines
threaten principles of equality and to adopt prophylactic rules
to deal with those situations." Id. at 490.
4.6
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
"Id. at 205.
4849 U.S.C. § 5503 (1991).





officials are responsible for monitoring the DBE program
and its participants."
The Court began its analysis in Adarand by noting
that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to individuals
and not groups. As a result of the Constitution's empha-
sis on the individual, group-based legislation is subject to
detailed inquiry to ensure that each citizen's right to3
equal protection has been maintained. This heightened
scrutiny required that Congress establish a remedy nar-
rowly tailored to meet the stated objective of addressing
discrimination in highway construction.4
The recent Supreme Court decisions of Croson and
Adarand highlight the evolution of the Court's treat-
ment of affirmative action plans. Through Adarand, the
Court has eroded Congress' power to ameliorate the ves-
tiges of discrimination. Historically, Congress has taken
the initiative to end racial discrimination by enacting
race-conscious remedies." As the Court articulated in
Croson, because states had been reluctant to address
problems of racial equality, state action on racial issues56
has been suspect. The practical application of strict
scrutiny at the state level, however, does not preclude
state or local governments from enacting race-conscious
legislation. Many states can successfully implement DBE
programs once the government proves that discrimina-
tion exists and a remedy is needed. By contrast,
Adarand's strict scrutiny requirement forces Congress
to evaluate the scope of discrimination across the coun-
try. It further requires Congress to draft legislation that
addresses the unique needs of each state so that the pro-
gram is neither overinclusive nor underinclusive.
Because Adarand applies a strict scrutiny standard to
federal affirmative action legislation, Congress no longer
enjoys the deference it once possessed under Croson in
enacting such legislation.
II.TITLE VII CHALLENGES TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
In recent years, constitutional challenges to affirma-
tive action have incorporated many of the factors used in
traditional Title VII analysis. 7 In many cases involving
Title VII analysis, the employer has implemented an affir-
53Id. at 227.Justice O'Connor failed to address her own rea-
soning in Croson which provided greater discretion for
Congressional action due to the powers of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the national perspective that Congress is able
to provide in legislation. Id.
"Id. at 228.
55Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1997).
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 490.
7See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995).
58This discussion does not address the government as an
employer that discriminates in hiring practices. In such a case,
the government would be engaging in active discrimination.
mative action plan because that specific employer has
discriminated. Courts utilize Title VII in assessing these
employment discrimination cases because they are a
subset of affirmative action much like governmental DBE
legislation. However, traditional Title VII analysis is inap-
propriate for evaluating government conduct in DBE
programs for a number of reasons. Unlike DBEs, aTitle VII
plan does not address the entire industry in which the
business participates. Furthermore, employees under
Title VII plans typically stay within the confines of their
business whereas contractors under DBE programs may
travel throughout a region or across the country to their
worksite. Finally, the goal in private affirmative action
plans is to rectify the immediate problem and change
long-term hiring policies. In contrast, governments
implementing DBE programs have different motives.
DBE programs have the secondary goal of changing soci-
ety by increasing the number of minority entrepreneurs
in the United States.
Typically, Title VII affirmative action plans are either
court-mandated or implemented by the employer to pre-
vent litigation. 5 Affirmative action plans that comply
with Title VII are of limited duration and attempt to rem-60
edy the results of prior discrimination. The cases involv-
ing Title VII affirmative action plans include agreements
between unions and companies to increase the numbers
of minorities in industries which have historically dis-
criminated against people of color.61 The Supreme Court
has also established that the antidiscrimination language
in Title VII applies to whites as well as blacks. This deci-
sion provides the basis for nonminorities to make Title
VII challenges to voluntary affirmative action plans, as
well as challenges to race-based legislation such as DBE
programs.
The first Title VII cases which came before the
Supreme Court determined the manner in which dis-
criminatory conduct would be evaluated. In such cases,
if a violation is found, the defendant is required to reme-
dy the problem. Typically, this remedy takes the form of
an affirmative action plan. The following cases illustrate
the manner in which affirmative action plans are evalu-
ated under Title VII.
63
In United Steel Workers of America v. Weber the
When the government, however, acts as a policy-maker or busi-
ness client, it may participate in passive discrimination. Passive
discrimination occurs when the government allows private
actors to discriminate among themselves, such as in the con-
struction industry.
5942 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (1997).
60
Id.
61See United Steel Workers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193 (1979).See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427
U.S. 273,281 n.8 (1970).
63Weber, 443 U.S. at 193.
6I
Id.
Supreme Court examined the validity of a voluntary affir-64
mative action program. In Weber, only 1.7 percent of all
skilled craftsmen at the Kaiser Aluminum plant were
black. 6' Blacks, however, comprised 39 percent of the
overall work force.6 To rectify this situation and prevent
a lawsuit, the local union and Kaiser Aluminum attempt-
ed to increase the number of skilled workers through a67
special training program. This voluntary affirmative
action plan required black and white workers to be cho-
sen on a one-to-one basis until the racial disparity was
eliminated.6 Although the remedy provision for Title VII
envisions race-based action to rectify past incidents of
discrimination, typically, there is an identifiable victim. In
Weber, however, there was no such victim. Kaiser
Aluminum, the employer, attempted to avoid a lawsuit
and potential punitive damages by implementing the vol-•69
untary affirmative action plan. Weber, a white unskilled
laborer, filed suit on the grounds that the program was
race-based and discriminated against whites.0
The Weber Court stated that the text of Title VII was
intended to encourage employers to evaluate their prac-
tices and endeavor to end racial discrimination.7'
Although section 703 of Title VII prohibits discrimination
on the basis of race under any circumstances,72 the Court
carved out an exception for companies attempting to
prevent litigation. 7 The Court held that Title VII does not
74
prohibit all private voluntary affirmative action plans. It
recognized that by allowing companies to voluntarily
rectify past discrimination, they would be abiding by the• , 75
spirit of the law An affirmative action plan that increas-
es opportunities for racial minorities without intruding
on the rights of white employees is acceptable. 7 The
program implemented must be a temporary plan to elim-
inate racial disparitr, and not a permanent plan to main-
tain racial balance.
Seven years later, the Supreme Court addressed








72Section 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) provides: "(a) ... It
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex or national origin; or employment in any way (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adverse-
ly affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex or national origin." Id.
73Weber, 443 U.S. at 204.
7'Id. at 208.
28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International
Association v. Equal Employment Opportunity
78
Commission. In this case, the Local Sheet Metal
79
Workers' union refused to admit nonwhite members. In
1969, the union altered its policy and permitted minori-
ties to join. Although official policy had changed, there
were still no nonwhite members by 1974.' Minorities
subsequently sued for admission. 82
The Supreme Court held that section 706(g) of
Title VII does not prevent a court from ordering race-
conscious relief as a remedy for past discrimination, nor
does the code only provide relief for the actual victims
of an employer's discrimination.8 The Court noted that
the availability of relief under Title VII allowed the judi-
cial system to fashion the most complete possible reme-
dy for past discrimination.85 It further recognized that
enjoining an employer or union from discrimination was
often an insufficient remedy if there was evidence of86
long-standing or egregious discrimination. Even after
formal discrimination had ceased, informal actions could
817
obstruct equal opportunities. For example, companies
may have a reputation for discrimination even after for-
mal poicy has changed, thus discouraging minority
applicants. Requiring the party at fault to admit quali-
fied minorities in the same proportions as found in the
labor pool may be the only effective way of eliminating
discrimination.
As illustrated by these cases, affirmative action plans
implemented underTitle VII address the narrow problem
of a specific employer's conduct.The Supreme Court has
held that once an affirmative action plan is implement-
ed, the plan must be of a limited duration.9 Furthermore,
the plan may or may not address an identifiable victim,
and it must have realistic goals based on the relevant
labor pool. These factors are determined by the demo-
graphics of the area, the nature of the employer's con-





7"Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International
Association v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,





8342 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1998).






90Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09.
9Id.
with the plan.9'
This Title VII analysis, however, addresses different
issues than those raised by DBE plans. Governments
implement DBE programs to rectify industry-wide dis-
crimination. In a DBE analysis, the geographic parameter
of the discriminatory conduct is nationwide. Therefore,
the nation is the relevant labor pool rather than a state or
locality, even if participants must register in each state to
enjoy the benefits of the DBE program.
II.THE ADARAND DISTRICT COURT'S EVALUATION OF
FEDERAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION UNDER THE STRICT
SCRUTINY STANDARD
As indicated earlier, Adarand's extension of strict
scrutiny to federal DBE programs places several hurdles
before Congress. Now, when enacting race-based legisla-
tion, Congress will have to meet standards such as those
articulated in the above Title VII affirmative action cases.
After the Supreme Court decided Adarand in 1995, the
Court remanded the case to the district court for a
rehearing under the strict scrutiny standard of review.92
Two years later, on June 2, 1997, the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado announced the
final decision in the Adarand case.
The Supreme Court's application of strict scrutiny to
federal race-conscious legislation left more questions unan-
swered than answered.The strict scrutiny standard is com-
prised of a two prong test.9 3 First, the state must demon-
strate a compelling interest in the enacted legislation.9
Second, the legislation must be narrowly tailored to
achieve the compelling state interest. 95 On remand, the
Colorado district court noted the difficulty in evaluating
the Intermodal Surface Transportation Act under the guide-
lines of the Supreme Court's vague ruling.9 The court
noted that the Adarand decision is ambiguous because the
Supreme Court failed to identify when the state has a com-
pelling interest in discrimination.9 7 Furthermore, the Court
provided no guidance for the district court in determining
what constitutes narrowly tailored race-based legislation.9
The final difficulty the district court faced involved deter-
mining which party had the burden of proof.99 Must the
plaintiff establish that the legislation was not narrowly tai-










"°Adarand, 965 E Supp. at 1571.
' d. at 1576.
'Id. at 1573.
lored, or did the government have the burden of proving
that the legislation was narrowly tailored?' °° These ques-
tions left a great deal of discretion to the district court in
its analysis of federal race-based legislation.
The district court began its analysis by discussing
the issue of compelling state interest.'° The court stated
that government has a compelling state interest in elimi-
nating discrimination through affirmative action.102
Because the United States argued that Congress' scope of
authority differs from state and local governments, the
evidence required to demonstrate a compelling govern-
mental interest will likewise be different. 3 Under
Croson, states must demonstrate that the racial groups
targeted in the legislation exist within the borders of the
state.104 Furthermore, they must have statistical and
anecdotal evidence of discrimination within the 
state.05
In Adarand, however, the district court stated that
Congress' power under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment is broader than that of the state and local106
governments. Congress may evaluate the entire nation
in determining whether there is industry-wide discrimi-107
nation. The district court noted that Congress' ability to
legislate nationwide problems places it on a higher con-
stitutional plane than a city council. 1" Therefore, the dis-
trict court concluded that evidence of discriminatory
barriers facing DBE's in federal construction contracts
nationwide would be sufficient to support a compelling109
governmental interest. This discrimination may be pas-
sive participation in private acts of discrimination or
active discrimination on the part of the government enti-110
ty in question. Despite the district court's recognition
that Congress is not required to prove discrimination
with the same particularity as that required of the states,
the court made it clear that Congress must "still establish
that the interest in eliminating the targeted evil is so
compelling that it justifies the use of race, the most sus-
pect of all classifications."ll
Notwithstanding the discussion of what constitutes
a compelling state interest, the district court stated that
H12
Congress had an even more difficult hurdle to jump.
The court noted that the second prong of strict scrutiny
requires that any nationwide legislation be narrowly tai-
lored to meet the compelling state interest." 3 Under the
1
04Croson, 488 U.S. at 497.
'
0
5Adarand, 965 E Supp. at 1576.
Id at 1573.
107Id
108•d. at 1572 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 489.)
•'d. at 1576.
110Adarand, 965 E Supp. at 1573.
...Id. at 1574.
Id. at 1577.
"'Id. at 1576.The district court outlined five factors that
may be relevant in determining whether an affirmative action
plan is narrowly tailored to achieve its goal. First, the court
district court's reasoning, Congress failed to satisfy the
second prong of the strict scrutiny test. 4The court held
that the DBE program is both overinclusive and underin-
clusive." s The program is overinclusive in that it pre-
sumes that the named minority groups are economically
and socially disadvantaged. The court stated that
Congress must determine whether a particular entity
seeking a racial preference has suffered from past dis-
crimination. 117The district court also held that the plan is
underinclusive because it excludes groups whose mem-
bers are economically and socially disadvantaged due to
past and present discrimination. Although there were
safeguards in the program designed to prevent over- or
underinclusiveness, the court determined that these
measures were insufficient. "9 Finally, the court found
that the remedial measures were unlimited in duration
and, therefore, failed to meet the standards set forth in
other Supreme Court cases.12
These stringent requirements make it difficult to
enact a nationwide race-based regulation such as the
DBE program in question. In fact, the district court in
Adarand even stated: "Contrary to the Court's pro-
nouncement that strict scrutiny is not 'fatal in fact,' I find
it difficult to envisa e a race-based classification that is
narrowly tailored." The district court's analysis here
cripples nationwide race-conscious legislation and
Congress' authority under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Moreover, the court's analysis fails to make
the distinction between the federal government address-
ing a national problem and the Title VII scenario where a
single employer is responsible for active discriminatory
conduct. Furthermore, any participant in the program
must demonstrate that it has been a victim of discrimi-
nation. The district court, however, did not address
where that discrimination must have taken place.
Because each state administers the DBE program indi-
vidually, does the applicant have to demonstrate discrim-
ination within the state in question or anywhere in the
country?
As evidenced by the district court's holding in
Adarand, the strict scrutiny standard articulated by the
Supreme Court has a negative impact on federal race-
conscious legislation. Once courts recognize that the
government is a passive participant in discrimination,
must determine whether there is a less intrusive method of
achieving the same objective. Second, the affirmative action
plan must be of limited duration and not designed to maintain
a specific racial balance.Third, there must be a logical relation-
ship between the percentage of minority group members in
the relevant population or workforce and the goals established
in the plan. Fourth, there must be a waiver provision if the hir-
ing plan cannot be met. Finally, the court must evaluate the
effect of the remedy upon innocent third parties. Id. at 1577
(citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 159, 187 (1987)).
'"Id. at 1580.
"l Adarand, 965 E Supp. at 1580.
then they should also recognize that Congress has a duty
to ameliorate the problem. The Fourteenth Amendment
grants Congress the authority to enforce its prohibition
against discrimination by government actors. Toward
this end, Congress is authorized to implement affirmative
steps to terminate this problem. Unlike discrimination
within a locality, industry-wide discrimination requires a
national remedy. If, however, Congress transfers to the
states the responsibility of legislating on the issue of dis-
crimination, then it is possible that some mobile busi-
nesses will move their operations to states that refuse to
address discrimination. Furthermore, DBE legislation
relates to business agreements with the federal govern-
ment. Even if state governments implement the program,
the money is still provided by the federal government.
Therefore, Congress is the only entity that can effective-
ly address the issue of discrimination.
I. GOVERNMENT REACTION TO ADARAND
Congress faces many difficulties in writing race-con-
scious legislation for the entire nation. Even if state and
local governments implement the program, the social
and economic disadvantages plaguing many of America's
citizens differ from city to city and from region to region.
Even though the district court in Adarand stated that
the federal government is not on the same constitution-
al plane as a city council, 113 the court's criticism that the
program was overinclusive and underinclusive indicates
that the federal government is required to legislate with
local specificity.114 This should not be the case. The
Adarand decision creates unnecessary barriers to
national redress of discrimination.
One method by which the federal government can
provide race-conscious remedies at a national level is
exemplified by the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Act (ISTA) which was the subject of Adarand. The ISTA
provides federal funding for state highway construc-
tion. As part of this funding, each state highway project
126
has a goal for minority participation. The ISTA requires.
state highway officials to implement the DBE program.17
Although these state employees are fully funded by the
federal government, and all monies associated with the







'2Adarand, 965 E Supp. at 1581.
Id at 1579.
122 U.S. Const. amend. W § 5.
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state has a great deal of latitude in implementing the DBE128
program. States must determine which businesses
qualify for the DBE program and what groups are social-
ly and economically disadvantaged. "9
In Adarand, the district court criticized the manner
in which the Colorado Department of Transportation
implemented the program. The state office did not pro-
vide adequate documentation to ensure that the partici-
pants in the program were victims of discrimination.The
district court also criticized the presumption of disad-
vantage for minority contractors. As a result of the dis-
trict court's decision, the Federal Highway Adminis-
tration proposed new regulations for state highway offi-132
cials administering this program. These regulations
include a variety of components which provide state
highway officials greater autonomy.3 For example, the
regulations allow state officials to operate the DBE pro-
gram according to the needs of the state without adher-
ing to all of the federal mandates as long as the officials
seek a waiver.3 4 In addition, states will also be required
to meet the DBE goals through community outreach, free
technical assistance in operating the business, and other
similar race neutral methods. For example, state and
regional transportation officials could sponsor free work-136
shops on the DBE program. This increase in race-neu-
tral remedies would help satisfy the district court's con-
cern that state highway officials failed to use less intru-
sive methods for increasing minority participation.137
Additional Federal Highway Adminstration regula-
tions include allowing DBE prime contractors to receive
evaluation credits over non-DBE contractors.'' An evalu-
ation credit will provide DBE prime contractors with a
one to ten percent price advantage during the bidding'39
process. DBE prime contractors may then be chosen if
they are within one to ten percent of the lowest bid. '40
Additionally, non-DBE prime contractors that use DBE
subcontractors would also receive evaluation credits.'
4'
States would be required to meet the DBE goal of ten
' Id.
129As stated earlier, most DBE programs include women as
well as racial minorities.Additionally, the ISTA contains a provi-
sion that allows anyone to apply if social and economic disad-
vantage is demonstrated under the SBA section 8(a) program.
Thus, the program does not exclude any group or individual.
Demonstrated disadvantage will earn participation in the pro-
gram.
l0Adarand, 965 E Supp. 15 1581.
132Cordell Parvin, Proposed DBE Regs Can Modify Goals,
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1Parvin, supra 132, at 12.
percent on each project primarily through the race-neu-
tral means articulated previously. However, if those
efforts failed, states would provide evaluation credits to
'43
encourage minority participation in the program.
Although some critics believe the proposed regula-
tions will cause state DBE programs to be quota driven, the
flexibility of the regulations will allow states to ensure that
their DBE programs are narrowly tailored.' 44 In this way, the
state can tailor its program to include groups that are dis-
criminated against within that locality. This amendment,
however, fails to address the concern that minority groups
which do not exist within the demographics of a state may
still suffer from discrimination while doing business in the
area. Under the regulations, any business may apply for cer-
tification as a DBE within a state."' If that business is
owned by an individual whose racial group does not exist
within the demographics of the community, then the busi-
ness may not qualify as a DBE even though it may suffer
from discrimination. This fact vividly illustrates the draw-
back in applying Title VII analysis to a business problem
rather than an employer/employee relationship.
Recent articles note that DBE programs are still
imperiled. One commentator has noted that nonminori-
ty contractors continue to contest the validity of DBE
programs which include percentage goals for minority146
participation. In fact, courts have held that such DBE'47
programs fail the strict scrutiny standard. For example,
in September 1997, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit ruled that a California state statute
• • 148
authorizing a DBE program was unconstitutional.
Despite recent court losses, President Clinton and
the federal government remain committed to DBE pro-
grams and affirmative action plans. In a document dated
March 12, 1996, the President stated that "[he] supports
affirmative action programs that are fair, effective and
balanced."149 Furthermore, in a memorandum to general
counsel of federal agencies, United States Associate












146Cordell Parvin, State MBE Statute Unconstitutional,
Roads & Bridges, January 1998, at 12.
'47
Id.
148Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson, 125 E3d 702 (9th
Cir. 1997). Monterey Mechanical challenged a state DBE pro-
gram. The program stated that contractors must meet the 15%
DBE participation goal or demonstrate good faith efforts to do
so.The 9th Circuit found the state statute unconstitutional. Id.
1 President's [sic] Clinton Supports Affirmative Action,
March 12, 1996 (document given to the author by Jesse
Haynes, West Virginia Department of Transportation).
The federal government is firmly committed
to fair employment practices that open oppor-
tunities to all Americans. It is also committed to
ensuring that its workforce draws on the full
range of the nation's talent. Affirmative action
efforts can advance those vital objectives. Thus,
to the extent that they comport with Adarand,
such efforts should be continued.'50
With the support of the federal government and con-
tinued attempts by President Clinton's administration to
develop programs that meet the Supreme Court's speci-
fications, it is doubtful that affirmative action has even
begun to "sing its swan song."
V DID ADARAND REALLY HAVE AN IMPACT ON DBE
PROGRAMS?
When the Supreme Court decided Adarand in 1995,
commentators predicted the demise of federal DBE pro-'5'
grams and the end of minority-owned enterprises. Has
Adarand significantly influence DBE programs? To eval-
uate the impact of Adarand, this last section will exam-
ine the number of DBEs participating in the Federal
Highway Administration's program.This section will also
include data from the Small Business Administration's
(SBA) section 8(a) program for socially and economical-
ly disadvantaged entrepreneurs.152
The ISTA defines a disadvantaged business enter-
prise to include such businesses which qualify under the
SBA section 8(a) program and those groups presumed
socially and economically disadvantaged. I" The state
department of transportation determines whether a
business qualifies for the program.5 4 This determination
is reached by interviewing the applicant and evaluating155
its financial status. Minorities with great personal
wealth or businesses with high gross incomes rarely156
qualify for the program. There is a rebuttable pre-
sumption that racial minorities are socially and econom-
ically disadvantaged. 117 Nonminority entrepreneurs may
qualify for the program by establishing that they are eco-
nomically and socially disadvantaged.
Every year, states compile data on their DBE program
for an annual review by the Federal Highway
Administration. Each state includes both the overall gross
revenue earned by DBEs that worked in the state and the
150Memorandum to General Counsel from United States
Associate Attorney General John R. Schmidt, "Post-Adarand
Guidance on Affirmative Action in Federal Employment,"
February 29, 1996.




overall percentage of highway construction work done
by DBEs during the year. The DBE administrator
reviews this data and formulates the goals for the next160
year. To determine whether Adarand has had an
impact on the DBE program to date, the figures from
Region III of the Federal Highway Administration are list-
ed below. This data compares both the number of DBE
participants and their gross revenue from 1987 to
1 9 9 6 .' 
6 1
Delaware
1987 % of All 14.8%
Contractors




in Millions of $
1996 DBE
Gross Revenue







23.9% 15.5% 14.2% 13.2%
Table Two
63
Gross Revenue Earned by DBEs
Delaware D.C. Maryland PA Virginia




$6,885 $9,477 $43,941 $71,641 $32,633 $38,819
The above charts illustrate that despite changes in
the law, the number of DBEs in Region III has not
changed with any statistical significance. In a compari-
son of data across the fifty states, the percentage of DBE
programs participating in the ISTA program has changed
little over the past few years. 164 The slight differences
that are present may be explained by any number of fac-
tors including: (1) the type of projects undertaken each
year; (2) the number of highway construction projects
underway each year; and (3) the number of businesses
that qualify for the DBE program. State and federal DBE
administrators remained unaffected by the Croson and
Adarand decisions. Despite subjecting DBE programs to
strict scrutiny, the programs experienced little if any
change in the total number of participants. If the Court's
ruling caused in change in the implementation of the
program, the rulings certainly did not cause the elimina-
tion of DBE programs that might have occurred.
15815 U.S.C. § 637(a) (1988).
15949 C.ER. S 23 (1991).
160
Id.
161Telephone interview with Jesse L. Haynes, Division
Director, Equal Employment Opportunity, West Virginia
Division of Highways (November 15, 1997). Data includes





The most compelling question raised by the
Adarand decision remains unanswered. Currently, it is
unclear whether the heightened standard of review
required by Adarand will result in fewer DBEs. More
importantly, it is uncertain whether DBE programs are
truly necessary for the advancement of minority-owned
businesses. In his book, How to Succeed in Business165
Without Being White, Earl Graves writes that racial
problems in business are more pronounced today than
they were twenty-five years ago. Graves' opinion com-
ports with the view of many individuals that people of
color are not given a fair chance without government
influence. 6 Grave's hypothesis is also supported by a168
recent congressional report. This 1994 House
Committee report highlighted many of the purposes of
DBE programs. 69 According to the report, DBEs were
necessary because minorities had fewer opportunities to
develop business skills and attitudes, obtain necessary
resources, and gain business experience.17 Societal prej-
udices faced by people of color also adversely impact the
minority entrepreneur when starting a new business. 
71
Such prejudices include public perceptions that minori-
ties are a financial risk, that they are unable to operate a
business for profit, and that minorities cannot survive in
a competitive environment.17 With such negative per-
ceptions, it is not difficult to understand why people of
color would be daunted by the prospect of entering the
business community.
In addition to the congressional report, recent stud-
ies have established the necessity of maintaining affir-
mative action programs. 17 Some commentators believe
that there are too few resources for the entire population
151See Koteles Alexander, Adarand: Brute Political Force
Concealed as a Constitutional Colorblind Principle, 39 How. L.J.
389-390 (1995).
15215 U.S.C. § 637(a) (1988). The Small Business
Adminstration section 8(a) program provides preferential
treatment for socially and economically disadvantaged small
businesses. Unlike the ISTA, the certification process occurs at
federal offices, and the requirements for certification are more
strin ent. Id.
See appendix A. Data from HCR-20, January 10, 1997.
Data does not include women.
165Earl G. Graves, How to Succeed in Business Without




a8Committee on Government Operations, "Problems
Facing Minority and Women-Owned Businesses, Including SBA
Section 8(A) Firms, In Procuring U.S. Government Contracts:
An Interim Report," H.R. Rep. No. 103-870 (2d Sess. 1994).
to achieve wealth.174 Therefore, some nonminorities may
fear DBE programs based on the principal of scarcity of
wealth. 75 In reality, these programs add to the wealth and176
economic stability of the country. Despite the popular
notion that amassing money is the only way to wealth,
the country's true wealth is its ability to help its citi-
zens. '7 Thus, there is a strong argument that government
has a moral responsibility to eliminate discrimination
and open doors for the poor and disadvantaged through
such programs as DBEs.
7.
The future of DBE legislation is fairly clear. The
courts are likely to find that many federal DBE programs
fail strict scrutiny unless Congress makes some signifi-
cant changes in the programs. The DBE programs must
have more race-neutral components to encourage
minorities into the marketplace. Furthermore, strong bar-
riers must be in place to insure that only the truly disad-
vantaged take part in the programs. Finally, the federal
government must develop data to substantiate DBE pro-
grams which reflect the nation's demographics. In indus-
tries such as highway construction, there may be very
few businesses in the country capable of certain types of
construction.These programs should reflect the mobility
of businesses within the industry.
Finally, the Supreme Court has yet to rule on an
important aspect of the DBE program, women-owned
businesses. These programs are still evaluated under
intermediate scrutiny. The next major challenge to
affirmative action will address women in the market-








Id.'73See Committee on Government Operations, "Problems
Facing Minority and Women-Owned Businesses, Including SBA
Section 8(A) Firms, In Procuring U.S. Government Contracts:
An Interim Report," H.R. Rep. No. 103-870 (2d Sess. 1994).
174Parren J. Mitchell & John Alfred Turner, 'Adarand 101," 7







179See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995).The Court stated that only race-based programs were at
issue. The women-owned business enterprise programs were
not affected by this decision.
APPENDIX A
TWELVE MONTH SUMMARIES OF FEDERAL-AID
RACIAL MINORITY (DBE) AWARDS IN PERCENTAGES
YEARS
States
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
D.C.
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
1993
6.0
12.3
3.5
3.9
14.0
6.2
4.7
8.3
7.4
6.7
3.4
25.4
3.1
5.7
4.6
7.2
5.0
1.5
9.2
0.8
6.9
9.2
6.3
3.7
4.5
3.3
1994
5.1
9.3
5.4
4.0
18.2
5.8
7.2
21.5
9.9
6.2
4.9
21.9
5.5
5.6
6.3
6.1
6.4
3.2
6.6
2.3
8.6
9.8
8.1
2.7
3.0
2.9
1995
7.2
7.4
7.8
2.8
18.1
7.1
4.4
40.5
6.3
4.8
3.6
14.3
2.5
6.4
7.9
5.8
7.2
7.6
7.6
1.8
8.3
8.4
7.3
3.0
6.8
3.9
1996
5.4
5.7
4.6
5.8
10.0
9.1
3.4
16.5
7.3
4.8
3.9
21.0
6.5
6.1
2.2
4.8
6.6
6.3
8.2
0.9
9.3
10.0
6.6
1.7
1.7
2.2
States 1993
Montana 5.1
Nebraska 10.0
Nevada 4.2
New Hampshire 16.2
New Jersey 5.3
New Mexico 16.8
NewYork 10.5
North Carolina 4.6
North Dakota 4.0
Ohio 5.1
Oklahoma 3.7
Oregon 4.5
Pennsylvania 8.2
Puerto Rico 113.2
Rhode Island 5.7
South Carolina 4.6
South Dakota 5.4
Tennessee 3.9
Texas 32.3
Utah 9.2
Vermont 7.5
Virginia 8.3
Washington 6.7
West Virginia 6.6
Wisconsin 4.9
Wyoming 6.1
1994
3.1
9.9
5.2
9.5
8.5
16.4
11.2
4.9
3.5
6.4
7.2
6.7
7.8
45.1
6.8
5.7
5.8
4.6
11.5
9.3
4.5
9.7
7.1
9.3
4.5
8.9
1995
6.4
8.1
2.2
31.1
10.1
25.1
7.3
4.9
1.7
6.5
6.3
6.4
6.7
68.7
6.7
6.5
4.0
4.5
9.0
7.2
8.8
9.5
7.4
8.9
4.8
6.7
1996
8.3
8.4
6.7
2.9
10.2
24.5
8.6
5.1
2.7
10.5
5.7
7.1
6.6
43.8
0.8
6.6
8.1
5.1
8.4
7.9
5.8
7.1
9.8
7.3
5.4
6.8
